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The preliminary reference procedure: challenge
or opportunity?
Jos Hoevenaars
Access to justice is a fundamental pillar of western legal culture […]. Therefore the
right to effective legal protection is one of the general principles of Community law,
in accordance with which access to justice is organised […]. Access to justice entails
not only the commencement of legal proceedings but also the requirement that the
competent court must be seized of those proceedings.
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion in Case C-14/08.
1 Introduction
Post-war efforts in Europe to establish an economic and political union have
transformed Europe from an international into a supranational semi-federal con‐
stellation. The legal integration of Europe preceded the political integration and
facilitated the economic integration. Many factors have contributed to the evolu‐
tion of the EU legal-political constellation, but because of its constitutionalizing
doctrines and its autonomous power vis-à-vis the Member States, the Court of
Justice of the European Union (ECJ)1 is widely considered to be largely responsi‐
ble for the unprecedented European integration – first and foremost of its legal
system but by extension of political and social spheres as well. These develop‐
ments have changed the relationship between citizen and authority, shifting the
political centre from the national to the supranational and making citizens sub‐
ject to new international norms, with far-reaching implications for the legal posi‐
tion of the citizen. On the one hand, this development has resulted in critical
evaluations of the EU’s democratic deficits focusing particularly on the lack of
representation. On the other hand, a fast growing discourse sees this federalizing
aspect of the EU as transforming the relationship between citizen and state, pos‐
sibly in favour of the former.
In this contribution, I focus on the meaning of access to justice in this suprana‐
tional setting and the role of the ECJ in providing legal remedies through its most
significant instrument; the preliminary reference procedure. To this end, the for‐
mal and practical possibilities for individuals to invoke their rights based on EU
law will be considered. Access to the ECJ will be framed in the broader perspective
1 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes in the names of EU judicial institutions. The Court of
Justice of the European Communities is now officially known as the ‘Court of Justice’ – but
informally it is still customary to refer to it as the European Court of Justice or ECJ. The former
Court of First Instance is now called the General Court. The EU’s judiciary as a whole – including
the ECJ, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, are collectively referred to as the Court
of Justice of the European Union (or ECJ).
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of supranational rule of law and individual empowerment. I will critically evaluate
prevailing themes in the literature on the position of the European citizen in the
EU and the state of access to justice in a supranational context. The insights of
this contribution are based on a combination of a study of the literature on Euro‐
pean integration and the ECJ as well as on empirical analysis, consisting of inter‐
views with litigants and their counsellors (35 interviews in total), in the context
of my PhD research into individual litigation before the ECJ.
2 The promise of EU law
The legal order of the EU functions as an important unifying factor in European
society in that it regulates relations between Member States, EU institutions, and
citizens as subjects of EU law. These interrelations are ‘legalized’ to a high degree.
In this sense, European society is above all a ‘community based on law’. Through
the proliferation of binding legislation at the EU level more and more aspects of
life in Europe are regulated at the supranational level and ultimately fall under
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has the task
to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is
observed’.2 With the significant characteristic that not only the Member States,
but also individuals, are subject to that law. The expanding scope of EU law, pene‐
trating national legal systems and framing national policy to a large extent, has
increased the significance of the EU legal system in the lives of EU citizens.
Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states that
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, toler‐
ance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the TEU stresses that the Union not only promotes the
well-being of its people but it shall also offer its citizens an ‘area of freedom,
security, and justice without internal frontiers’. This is the formulation of the
promise made by the European Union directly to the people of Europe, highlight‐
ing the nature of the Union as going beyond mere intergovernmental politics. In
addition, a strong focus on individual rights is manifest in the EU’s legislation
and was reiterated in 2010 in the so-called ‘Stockholm Programme’, which states
that “Priority should be given to mechanisms that facilitate access to justice, so
that people can enforce their rights throughout the Union.”3 The EU thus formu‐
lates a promise to its citizens focusing on rights and justice. Apart from a legiti‐
mizing discourse, the formulating of individuals rights also serves a more prag‐
matic function in ensuring the application and enforcement of EU legislation. The
2 Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union.
3 European Council 2010, p. 4.
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EU, with its limited administrative capacity, has always struggled to ensure com‐
pliance by the Member States. One of the ways this has been resolved has been by
relying on the legal system in revealing and addressing breaches of EU law obliga‐
tions by Member States. One can read these rights as promises of the protection
of individuals against Member States’ trespasses with regard to the unification of
areas of movement, work, migration, and related areas of social life.
This European ‘language of rights’ or ‘rights-based regime’ – the notion that the
EU legal system functions by formulating (enforceable) rights – stood at the basis
of much change within Europe. Through the jurisprudence of the ECJ in judge‐
ments on preliminary references and the efforts of the Commission in holding
Member States accountable for their failure to comply with EU law, the EU has
been able to extend the reach of supranational influence on national policy. Sche‐
pel describes this idea of ‘emancipatory functionalism’ as one of the apparent self-
legitimating descriptions of the role of EU law by lawyers of the ‘European per‐
suasion’.4 It is what he calls “a stunning assertion of the power of European law
liberating civil society from the shackles of parliamentary democracies.”5 This
self-description is essential in understanding, on the one hand, the success of the
European legal system (in that it effectively worked as described, most notably in
curtailing the power of the nation states), and on the other hand, the ways in
which this system has been justified and legitimized by its propagators, by refer‐
ence to the individual empowerment and benefit that allegedly resulted from it.
The assumption being that “Law belongs to civil society, and civil society finds in
European law the framework for its cross border dynamism.”6 The sole authority
of the ECJ to interpret EU legislation combined with a growing focus on individ‐
ual rights seems to signal a shift towards greater empowerment of the individual
within the European legal system. In the famous words of Federico Mancini – one
of the most influential ECJ judges in the history of the institution – “taking law
out of the hands of bureaucrats and politicians and giving it ‘back to the people’”.7
3 The ‘Dual Vigilance’ of the EU legal system
Over the years, the ECJ has been fairly successful in enforcing compliance with
EU legislation and its judgements. One ally for the Court in this respect has been
the European Commission that can bring Member States before the Court on
charges of not complying with the relevant requirements of EU law. Since Van
Gend en Loos8 it has also become clear that the Court also, and arguably predomi‐
nantly, relies on private parties to enforce EU law by mobilizing their rights.
4 Schepel & Chalmers 2004, p. 3.
5 Ibid, p. 2.
6 Ibid.
7 Mancini & Keeling 1994, p. 183.
8 Van Gend en Loos (C-26/62) was the landmark case in which the ECJ established the principle of
Direct Effect, giving both natural and legal persons the ability to enforce legal rights derived
from the Treaties before the courts.
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Private parties were, however, never given the same amount of opportunities to
activate the European legal system to this end. Whereas the European Commis‐
sion and the Member States can resort to Articles 258 and 259 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) respectively,9 private parties were
provided no ‘European level’ judicial control over Member States’ violations of
Treaty obligations. They in turn have to rely on ‘national level’ control by means
of invoking the direct effect of EU law in national court proceedings. Whereas the
first of the two was clearly marked out in the Treaty from the outset, the second
route to rights enforcement was developed some years later by the ECJ itself in
its landmark decision Van Gend en Loos. In this judgement, the Court effectively
established the legal means for private parties to hold Member States accountable
for any violations on rights conferred upon them by the Treaty, albeit in a less
direct form than the procedures available for Member States and the European
Commission. In addition, addressing objections by Member States who argued
that Articles 258 and 259 (then 169 and 170) of TFEU already provided a system
for exercising supervision of Treaty violations, the Court proclaimed:
The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an
effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169
and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States.
Thus, a second avenue for challenging the breach of EU law, one that included pri‐
vate parties as possible benefactors of EU law, was called into existence. This
‘Dual Vigilance’10 not only made it more likely for Treaty provisions to be
observed by contracting states, it also stood at basis of the transformation of the
entire European legal system. Private parties were now able to invoke EU law and
rights conferred upon them before national courts, the effects of which would
prove to be significant.
4 The magic triangle of EU law: empowering citizens?
The doctrines of direct effect and primacy of EU law have dramatically diminished
domestic authorities’ possibility of relying on national law to justify national pol‐
icy.11 National judges, in their capacity as EU judges, are required to resolve any
conflict between national and EU law by ruling in favour of the latter. Whenever
doubt is raised on the interpretation of EU law and possible conflict between
national legislation or policy and EU principles, national judges may, and in some
cases must, refer the matter to the ECJ via a reference for a preliminary ruling.
The rulings given by the ECJ in these preliminary references have the force of res
judicata. This means that they effectively function as vertical precedent and that
9 In practice, due to the obvious political sensibility of such proceedings, Member States have pro‐
ven very reluctant to use Article 259 against another Member State. To date, this has in fact only
occurred four times (Cases: C-141/78, C-388/95, C-145/04, C-364/10).
10 Weatherill 2014, p. 86.
11 Alter 1998, p. 121.
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the Court’s decision provides an explanation on the basis of which the case at
hand is to be decided by national judges. They also have horizontal effect in that
the Court’s decisions apply in all Member States and its rulings establish the prin‐
ciples on which all national courts are to rule in similar cases in future.
Because of the ground-breaking effects of preliminary rulings in the history of the
ECJ, the preliminary reference procedure is the widely considered the central
mechanism, or backbone, of the European legal system and moreover is put for‐
ward as the main means by which individual rights can be (and have been)
invoked, consolidated, and expanded. With reference to Dworkin, a rapport pub‐
lished by the European Parliament expresses this view on the preliminary refer‐
ence procedure:
Thus, individuals may use EU law both as a ‘shield’ (to defend themselves
from action by national authorities which infringes EU rights) and as a
‘sword’ (to challenge national measures on the grounds of incompatibility
with EU laws). Consequently, the preliminary ruling procedure provides an
opportunity for individuals and national courts to question governmental
actions.12
Jurisprudence of the ECJ, and especially the influential precedential function and
ground-breaking effects thereof, leads to the conclusion that ‘the magic triangle’
of the doctrines of primacy and direct applicability in combination with the pre‐
liminary reference procedure give individuals and civil society a stake in the
transformation of Europe’s political and legal order as well as the opportunity to
defend their rights, and leads some scholars to conclude that this is in fact an ave‐
nue for empowerment for individuals and civil society.13 The argument being as
follows: fragmentation of political power transforms democratic structures and
diminishes national sovereignty. When political power is mediated to a large
extent by legal structures, access to these structures could be seen as a way of
influencing the political process. The ECJ is seen as the place where citizens and
civil society can challenge national policy and are thus in a sense ‘empowered’
against their government, because this mechanism enables them to ‘outflank’ the
national jurisdiction.
This theory of ‘empowerment trough EU law’ focuses on the preliminary refer‐
ence procedure with the assumption that it gives firstly, the power to influence
the course and pace of European legal and political development, and secondly,
the possibility of having national legislation, policy, and acts reviewed by a higher
judicial authority, the ECJ. The basic premise of this approach is that because the
course and pace of legal integration in Europe is very much driven by litigation at
and adjudication of the ECJ, the possibility for citizens to petition the Court pro‐
vides them with the means to influence this process of unification, and thus gives
them a stake in Europe’s democratic process. In light of the purported democratic
12 Batta 2007.
13 Cichowski 2007.
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deficit of the EU as a whole this is even be considered by some as providing a rem‐
edy for Europe’s lack of transparency and representative governance.
5 The Court of Justice of the European Union: a ‘People’s Court’?
Alongside the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of recent developments in
EU citizenship law and the area of freedom security and justice are giving more
and more substance to the idea of true European rule of law. One element
strongly connected with the concept of the rule of law is what can be determined
as ‘public power’, which entails the possibility of non-state actors, most notably
individuals, to invoke judicial authority against the abuse of power by the state.
One approach of the political role of the ECJ as ‘Supreme Court’ of the EU con‐
tends that, since the Court has jurisdiction over the legality of (both national and
supranational) governmental action in light of EU law, it effectively enforces the
power of semi-constitutional judicial review. The EU legal system has thus forged
a novel possibility for private parties that are now permitted to subject govern‐
ment acts which impinge on their interests to judicial scrutiny.14 The primacy and
direct applicability of EU law have served as federalizing instruments altering the
status of states in international law and introducing private parties as subjects of
international law.15 And this in turn implies the establishment of ‘European rule
of law’, with a common judicial tribunal with sole jurisdiction over EU law, the
ECJ.
Access to courts from a supranational rule of law perspective thus brings with it
elements of scale and impact not found at the national level.16 Access to justice in
this supranational setting can be seen as empowering citizens to influence
national policy, and by extension the scope of international constitutionalism,17
through the opportunity to invoke the reviewing powers of a (new) higher judicial
authority. In case of the EU, this judicial authority is the ECJ, which is charged
with the task of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of EU rules
and norms. When ECJ adjudication is viewed as neutral arbitration in a political
sphere that is characterized more by bargaining and negotiation than by demo‐
cratic representation, access to the ECJ might thus provide the individual a stake
in a game in which he/she is structurally disadvantaged.
14 With restrictions of course, see Scheingold 1965, p. 41-48.
15 Cf. Weiler 1998, p. 380, on the actual status of individuals as subjected but not subjects. On
understanding the relation between law and democracy in Europe: ‘Individuals, not only States,
are thus subjects. Semantically, in English, “subjects” is often synonymous with citizenship. The
Queen’s subjects of old are the present citizens of the Realm. It could seem, thus, that in the very
articulation of one of the principle “constitutionalizing” doctrines – direct effect – the condition
was provided by elevating individuals to the status of full subjects alongside Member States. […]
But note, individuals are “subjects” only in the (direct) effect of the law. In this sense alone is
Europe a new legal order. […] Enjoying rights created by others does not make you a full subject
of the law.’
16 It should be noted that – while not in the Netherlands – a number of EU countries have constitu‐
tional courts that can resolve some of these questions.
17 Kumm 2011.
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The main question that arises, is whether all this taken together constitutes an
actual empowerment of the individual or whether it can more accurately be con‐
sidered part of an ongoing legitimizing rhetoric? In other words, the question is
whether this idea of individual empowerment through EU law is placing too much
emphasis on ‘possibilities’ for individuals, and has too little regard for the ways
this plays out in practice. In EU (legal) studies, there has been little micro-socio‐
logical analysis into these opportunities, and most conclusions in this direction
are based on macro-analysis and broad developments in ECJ jurisprudence. The
next section therefore deals with access to the ECJ from a practical point of view,
in line with AG Colomer’s requirement of access to justice that ‘the competent
court must be seized’. In other words, I focus on the procedural as well as socio‐
logical aspects of access to the ECJ, challenging the notion of individual empow‐
erment by critically examining access to justice in the European context.
6 Seizing the Court of Justice of the European Union
Considering access to the ECJ there are three principal mechanisms through
which individuals may seize the Court. First, there are the action for annulment18
and the preliminary reference procedures that involve individual court cases,
either directly before the ECJ in case of the former, or indirectly via the national
legal system in case of the latter.19 Additionally, there is the possibility for indi‐
viduals to address the European Commission with a complaint about the non-
compliance of a Member State with EU legislation. These complaints may urge
the Commission to start infringement proceedings against the Member State,
thus indirectly providing a judicial remedy before the ECJ. Before considering the
preliminary reference procedure, I will briefly consider the other two avenues
from an individual’s perspective.
6.1 Direct access to the Court of Justice
Direct access to the ECJ for private parties is limited to contesting the validity of
measures adopted by EU institutions, and from an individual’s perspective to the
relationship citizen/EU. Furthermore, the strict interpretation of standing rules
for private parties by the ECJ means that EU measures can only be contested if
and when they directly affect the individual. In practice this means that only a
small minority of private parties may be eligible to access the ECJ via this route
and therefore, as a legal remedy these procedures are practically less relevant.
Individual claimants therefore make up only a fraction of these direct actions.
Additional to strict standing rules, Costa describes a few elements that can be dis‐
suasive for potential litigants in deciding to start these kinds of proceedings:
Length of the proceedings, legal costs, and needed expertise combined with the
18 Actions for Annulment are dealt with by the General Court and can be appealed before the Court
of Justice.
19 The EU also offers non-judicial mechanisms, such as the European Ombudsman, to whom one
can file complaints about maladministration within the EU institutions and bodies. The focus of
this contribution is, however, on judicial mechanisms.
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risks of losing. Based on interviews with its judges and clerks, and by studying the
Courts case law as well as its internal structural reforms, Costa concludes that
[t]he [ECJ] seems to consider that broader dissemination of the Court’s juris‐
prudence and the principle of supremacy of Community law over national law
contribute more to democracy in the Union and better protection of funda‐
mental rights than easier access to the Court.20
This is in line with the conclusion drawn by Rasmussen decades earlier that the
Court made efforts to channel questions of judicial review through preliminary
references.21 When looking at the possibility of direct petitioning of the Courts
authority vis-à-vis the EU he concludes:
There is therefore a strong discrepancy between the restrictive attitude of the
[General Court] which limits possibilities of bringing direct actions to a privi‐
leged minority, and the ambitions of the Member States which consider law
and access to law as essential to further legitimacy and democracy in the
Union.22
The restrictive interpretation of standing for individual claimants as well as the
aforementioned practical barriers all diminish the significance of these proce‐
dures as a possible remedy for individual claimants. Although in essence a remedy
against invalid measures by EU institutions, in practice, this mechanism thus is
reserved for a small minority and a particular kind of litigant.
6.2 Complaining to the European Commission
The European Commission summarizes its own role as stimulating the Member
States to comply with Union law as quickly as possible, for which it has the
infringement procedure at its disposal. The Commission’s White Paper23 on Euro‐
pean governance emphasized the vital role played by the numerous complaints
the Commission receives from citizens of the Members States in signalling
infringements on Union law. However the Commission has, in both practice and
policy, shown a preference for more cost-effective, non-litigious rule enforcement
through informal resolution. The Commission enjoys discretion in whether or not
it chooses to act on those complaints and initiate Article 258 proceedings against
a Member State suspected of trespassing Treaty obligations – its hand cannot be
forced. Although infringement actions are numerous, the Commission brings
alleged infringements before the Court in only a minority of cases. Both Commis‐
sion and Member States can be seen to make efforts in resolving allegations with‐
out Court procedures. In fact, even during the formal part of proceedings discus‐
sions between Commission and Member States continue and a significant part of
20 Costa 2003, p. 754.
21 Rasmussen 1986.
22 Costa 2003, p. 755.
23 European Commission 2001, p. 428.
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infringements are settled without Court intervention. In 2012, for instance, a
total of 1062 infringement cases were closed by the Commission before Court
proceedings, either after the initial letter of formal notice (661 cases), after the
issuing of a reasoned opinion by the Commission (359 cases) or cases were with‐
drawn from the court (42 cases). In 2012, only 46 infringement cases were
resolved through a Court judgement. Therefore, since the Commission has discre‐
tion over whether or not to initiate actions against a Member State, from an indi‐
vidual complainants’ perspective there is little certainty as to whether this strat‐
egy will yield the desired result. Also this mechanism provides no form of individ‐
ual redress or any form of interim measures. Only after infringement proceedings
have been brought with a successful outcome may one claim damages following
the Francovich doctrine, before the national courts.
6.3 Preliminary references
The preliminary reference procedure is rightfully heralded as the backbone of the
European legal system. Under Article 267 of the TFEU, a national judge may
request the ECJ to provide an interpretation of a provision of EU law that is nee‐
ded to resolve a dispute pending before its court. Historically the most far-reach‐
ing judgements by the ECJ have resulted from preliminary references, and in vari‐
ous cases they were the result of active litigating efforts by the parties involved.24
Although there is a general consensus on the pivotal role played by the prelimi‐
nary reference system, literature on the procedure has resulted in an either/or
image of the possibilities resulting from it. Either the procedure is viewed mostly
as a technical solution to the question of effective governance of a differentiated
European legal landscape, or the procedure is part of a legal realm that provides
private parties with the opportunities to play an active part in European govern‐
ance through litigation before the ECJ. Both approaches yield a different focus of
analysis as well as different blind spots, with the former focusing on high-impact
cases and the interest politics and pressure groups often found to be behind the
litigation, and the latter investigating mainly the relationship and collaboration
between the ECJ and national judges. While the former, in its selective focus on
successful litigation and opportunities often fails to describe the obstructions and
social inequality in opportunities, the latter fails to recognize any active role
played by private actors and litigants altogether. These shortcomings are now
being recognized and in recent years we see a shift in the research focus from a
legalistic perspective to more embedded and interdisciplinary analysis, with a
socio-historic turn25 as the most prominent example. It is submitted, that focus‐
ing on landmark cases alone may overestimate the success potential of the proce‐
dure as a true remedy. Like in the case of direct actions, considering the prelimi‐
nary reference procedure as an opportunity for justice should not be taken at face
24 Apart from the two foundational judgments Van Gend en Costa, the famous example of Belgian
feminist lawyer Vogel-Polsky’s prolonged efforts in mobilizing the dead letter of Article 119 in
the Treaty of Rome through the Defrenne cases (I, II, and III), is a case in point. The success of
cases seminal like these has been largely responsible for the proliferation of the European law
rights-narrative.
25 See especially the work done by Rasmussen 2012.
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value. In order to truly evaluate the empowering potential of this legal procedure
we cannot merely draw our conclusions based on successes in the past. We need
to look at the practice of the procedure and who is able (and maybe more impor‐
tantly who is not able) to employ the procedure as a means to realize (individual)
rights.
6.4 Empirical findings
Based on interviews with litigants and their supporters (counsellors and others)
who have been involved in preliminary references I have distinguished some miti‐
gating effects on the use of the preliminary reference procedure as a legal remedy.
The next section deals with some of the practical obstacles to considering prelimi‐
nary references in this manner. Respondents were selected from all references for
a preliminary ruling from Dutch courts involving individual litigants over a 5-year
period, between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2012. Of 25 out of the total 38
cases in the selection at least one of the parties involved (litigant or counsel) was
traced and interviewed. Cases that reach the ECJ span a host of different areas of
law, but since EU law mainly addresses administrative issues the vast majority
concern conflict between private parties and the state. In the case selection for
my research, only one case was between two private parties. Contrary to what one
may assume based on newspaper articles and other publications on ECJ cases,
and contrary even to some of the empowerment rhetoric of EU institutions and
legal scholars, the preliminary reference procedure is not a form of appeal nor is it
a mechanism that can be employed as such by litigating parties.26 It is always the
national judge who can, and in some cases must, refer a case to the ECJ, when‐
ever he or she is uncertain on the interpretation of EU legislation. This sounds
very passive from a justice seeker’s perspective, and in many cases it is, however it
can also be, and several ground-breaking cases have shown it to be, a viable way of
reaching the ECJ and actively evoking a judgement on a principle issue. There‐
fore, first of all, a distinction has to be made between ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ liti‐
gants.27
Selecting cases based on their reaching the ECJ through a reference captures both
successful attempts at harnessing the procedure as a judicial strategy, as well as
numerous cases where neither party was actually seeking a referral. In these latter
cases, it was merely the considerations of the national judge that lead to a refer‐
ral. Considering the average time of 20 months it takes the ECJ to decide these
cases, it should be obvious that for these litigants this is usually not greeted with
great enthusiasm. In this sense the preliminary reference procedure itself may
actually be considered a procedural obstacle in a practical sense. An often-over‐
26 Formulations in newspapers are often along the lines of: ‘the claimant has brought the matter
before the Court of Justice.’
27 Harlow & Rawlings 1992.
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looked yet important aspect of the procedure, which can lead litigants to drop
their case due to extended duration of the proceedings.28
In a significant number of the cases, however, interested players can be found to
aim proactively for references when contesting national policy or seeking to
resolve principle questions of law. These actors can be further divided into two
categories, based on whose interests are being served. First there is the very select
group of active individual litigants, often acting pro se, who seek to employ every
remedy possible in their legal claim. Since in these cases their claim includes an
EU law element one such remedy is the referral of the case to the ECJ. However,
since this requires significant legal expertise from a party, this group is very small
indeed (only three such examples were found). The second category encompasses
actors with more agency, including accountancy firms seeking to get a principle
judgement on matters of interest to their clientele, so-called cause lawyers indi‐
vidually seeking to get an answer to a principle question and the more strategi‐
cally motivated alliances of interest groups, lawyers, and academics proactively
contesting national policy.
The empirical research into litigation through the preliminary reference proce‐
dure reveals several practical obstacles to the proactive use of the preliminary ref‐
erence procedure as a litigation strategy. In the case of preliminary reference pro‐
cedure as an empowering tool this breaks down to expertise and opportunity; the
expertise that is necessary to make use of opportunities provided by these legal
structures. First of all there has to be an EU law or principle on which to litigate,
but one also needs the know-how to signal a discrepancy between EU law provi‐
sions and national policy. Which, of course, not every lawyer, let alone litigant
will possess? This lack of know-how also plays a role once a case gets referred to
the ECJ. In a large portion of the cases investigated we see lawyers, even once
their case is referred to the ECJ, seeking assistance from experts in EU law, usu‐
ally academics. Which confirms the lack of expertise of these practitioners in the
field of EU law? This can be explained by the fact that because of the rare occasion
of references to the ECJ it is not easy, let alone commercially interesting for law‐
yers to develop expertise in this area.
The extra effort and expertise that goes in to these cases of course is accompanied
by additional costs. From the interviews, I conducted it is clear that it is usually
the lawyers themselves who ‘pick up the bill’, motivated by the fact that a referral
usually concerns a principle issue and they are effectively litigating on behalf of
more people than merely their direct clients. There are even examples of lawyers
continuing their case after their client has in fact given up, or when they have lost
contact with their client all together. From a strategic perspective, the uncer‐
tainty of whether or not a case is referred to the ECJ makes is hard to prepare a
case, or anticipate the necessary extra work. Moreover, in case of an unexpected
referral it is often too time-consuming, and thus expensive, to rework the case or
28 It is important to realize in this respect that the average time of 20 months it takes the ECJ to
complete a case is additional to the time one has already spent in the national legal system. The
total time of which, in some cases, mounted to up to 12 years; a significant burden on any indi‐
vidual.
Recht der Werkelijkheid 2015 (36) 3
doi: 10.5553/RdW/138064242015036003007
93
Dit artikel uit Recht der Werkelijkheid is gepubliceerd door Boom juridisch en is bestemd voor Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 59665+65441
Jos Hoevenaars
to hire a specialist in order to work a case extensively. From a general practi‐
tioner’s point of view, specializing in EU law, because of its sporadic occurrence in
their practice, is well-nigh impossible. This lack of experience greatly diminishes
lawyers’ effectiveness once their case is brought before the ECJ where they find
themselves up against (often several) representatives of Member States who liti‐
gate before the Court on a regular basis.
The more strategic players, however, are able to muster the needed expertise
beforehand. We therefore see efforts in proactively soliciting a reference being
made by actors like interest groups and other social action organizations who can
employ the necessary expertise. In these cases the matter is framed as an EU law
issue and the whole litigation strategy can be tuned towards a possible reference.
This means, however, that if you wish to contest certain policies via this route
there is a need to have a case, or find one. This requires access to potential liti‐
gants, because you need a willing litigant who provides a case on which to go to
court.29 Therefore interest groups and other strategic actors actively employ EU
law and litigation as one of their modes of contesting policies by bringing
together specific strategic actors like scholars and legal practitioners and trying to
find ways to resolve the constraints mentioned. Practitioners are the ones who
potentially have cases, and scholars usually have the needed expertise.30
An obstruction to using the preliminary reference procedure, and possibly the
most problematic obstacle from a public power perspective, which greatly dimin‐
ishes the effectiveness of the whole procedure, is the fact that the Member State
government in fact has the opportunity to prevent a judgement from the ECJ.
Since references regularly deal with questions of national legislation or policy’s
legality in light of EU legislation, a judgement by the ECJ may threaten national
policy. From the perspective of the national government, references can therefore
be very undesirable, and the state will put in efforts to prevent a reference or a
judgement. Those lawyers that were interviewed who were trying to aim for refer‐
ences stated that it is not unusual for the government to curtail possible negative
judgements this way. A recent Dutch example can be found in the Imran case,31
where the Dutch Ministry of Justice was quick to provide a residence permit to
the claimant once the case was referred the ECJ, in order to prevent an unfavour‐
able judgement on the policy on integration requirements for migrants. To this
strategic action by the state there is no remedy because the case is resolved before
the principle question gets answered, and the ECJ has an established policy of not
29 The famous Defrenne cases are also a case in point, showing ElianeVogel-Polsky’s (the main
driver behind the litigation) troubles in finding a willing individual on whose account she could
address the issue of equal pay.
30 A recent example is the almost 15-year battle between the Dutch Government and private actors
on the subject of raises in administrative fees for residence permits for migrants (leges). One
Dutch interest group formed a working group together with lawyers, academics and other inter‐
est groups in order to attack the policy via legal means. The group initiated several legal proceed‐
ings, including preliminary references and infringement proceeding by the European Commis‐
sion to fight the policy (successfully) via the courts.
31 Case C-155/11.
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answering hypothetical questions. Of course, in these instances, research into the
ECJ’s track record will never reveal these dynamics at the national level.
All these elements taken together thus reveal some significant practical chal‐
lenges to considering the preliminary reference procedure as a tool of empower‐
ment.
7 Conclusions
The so-called ‘emancipatory functionalism’ of EU law, as a legitimizing rhetoric,
creates high expectations for European citizens by offering individual empower‐
ment and the ‘liberation of civil society from the shackles of parliamentary
democracies’.32 However, one critical aspect to this individual rights rhetoric is
the truism that the mere proclamation of rights does not necessarily mean actual
change in one’s situation. On what he famously called ‘the myth of rights’, Schein‐
gold states in this respect:
The assumption is that litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from
courts; that it can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights;
and, finally, that realization is tantamount to meaningful change. The myth of
rights is, in other words, premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights and
remedies with social change.33
The legal perspective on the subjects of rights, remedies, social change and litiga‐
tion from an EU law perspective encourages a focus on judicial decisions and their
implementation, hence, the extensive literature on the ECJ’s track record. The
findings presented in this article critically examine these assumptions of macro-
approaches to the preliminary reference procedure as a judicial remedy in light of
the debate on access to justice. They shed light on the practicality of the prelimi‐
nary reference procedure as a so-called ‘shield’ and a ‘sword’, empirically compli‐
cating the rights rhetoric and the narrative of empowerment by showing the con‐
straints on the use of this procedure as a means to an end.
Considering the preliminary reference procedure as an empowering tool it comes
down in large part to the mitigating effects of the expertise that is necessary to
make use of opportunities provided by the structures of EU law. The nature of the
preliminary reference procedure makes deliberately aiming for the ECJ via this
route an uncertain endeavour indeed. The distinct nature of the EU legal system
compared to traditional national forms of litigation strategies makes for an
enhanced opportunity to circumvent the national judiciary and thus increased
chances. However, the ability to make use of this procedure for underprivileged
parties is, next to structural barriers, greatly hampered by an unequal distribution
in legal agency and the ability to employ experts. Although the development of
the European legal system has provided new avenues for individuals to seek jus‐
32 Schepel & Chalmers 2004, p. 2.
33 Scheingold 1974, p. 5.
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tice, and the ECJ has been an important ally for private interest and judicial poli‐
tics in recent decades, the rhetoric surrounding it may be an overstatement of the
actual empowering effects of EU law for individual litigants.
The emancipatory functionalism of the procedure has made the preliminary refer‐
ence procedure a target for interest litigation by pressure groups. The rhetoric
around the preliminary reference procedure as described above is based in large
part on some prime examples of successful interest litigation and mobilization of
EU law, fostering the ideal of the preliminary reference procedure as a particularly
viable route to justice and rights granting tool. However, the practice of this is
more about macro-legal developments and a form of extended political negotia‐
tion than about access to a meaningful form of justice. On the one hand, it does
provide new possibilities for ‘trumping’ the domestic legal system whenever the
supranational legislation provides opportunities against national legislation, giv‐
ing interest groups an incentive to use the procedure, on the other hand, from a
litigant’s perspective, as a form of remedy the PRP remains a difficult ‘sword’ to
harness, and the active use of it is therefore largely reserved for a minority of
‘Eurolawyers’ with the necessary credentials, means, and expertise.34 When con‐
sidering the ideal of a veritable rule of law in the EU the nature of the PRP is thus
closer to its original intended function as an aid to national judges in their adjudi‐
cation than as a ‘shield’ and ‘sword’ for citizens to use. Thus, the system of pre‐
liminary references as a remedy for private parties, in its current form, does pro‐
vide opportunities not available at the national level, yet the possibility of proac‐
tively seizing these opportunities is not equally distributed. It requires significant
amounts of capital, both financial and legal, to successfully make use of this pro‐
cedure. Therefore focusing, in line with AG Colomer’s argument, on the practice
of access to justice in the European judicial system, all the successes of the proce‐
dure notwithstanding, we should be wary of considering the preliminary refer‐
ence procedure as a veritable form of access to justice from a litigant’s perspec‐
tive.
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